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Finding an electoral system both equitable and efficient represents a desideratum for 
every electoral democracy. The electoral system is at the cornerstone of democracy and has 
important consequences upon the constitutional and political system as a whole. Through 
this approach, I bring the spotlight on the old dispute over proportional representation and 
majoritarian voting systems. Thus, I will determine which of these main electoral systems is 
closer to the ideal of electoral equity. 
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Referring to the importance of the regulation of the electoral system, Royer - Collard 
stated that “an electoral law is a Constitution. Depending on how good or bad the law is, the 
governments resulting from it are strong or weak”2. Choosing a certain electoral system is 
of great significance and there are several aspects that must be considered, such as the 
influence it has on political parties, on government formation and last, but not least, on 
voting behaviour. Besides, each state must take into account its own historical and political 
background and also the social and economic particularities, when designing the electoral 
system. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the principle that should guide the “electoral 
engineering” is that of equity and fairness. Unfortunately, most of the times, the electoral 
systems are the result of political opportunism because political parties are more interested 
in winning the election than in pursuing electoral equity. 
As I have mentioned, my aim is to determine which of the electoral systems, 
majoritarian or proportional ones, best complies with the principle of electoral equity. In 
order to do that, a definition of the concept of “electoral equity” is required. Therefore, 
before analyzing the virtues and deficiencies of both proportional representation and 
majoritarian voting systems, invoked by their advocates and opponents, I will configure the 
notion of “electoral equity” and also establish the criteria by which one could appreciate the 
fairness (equity) of an electoral system.  
 
The concept of electoral equity. Criteria for assessing the equity of an electoral system 
 
The notions of equity and fairness are usually invoked in the debate over proportional 
representation and majoritarian systems, the electoral systems based on proportional 
representation being regarded as fairer than the majority and plurality systems. The concept 
of fairness is used more frequently than the concept of equity, even though they are 
considered to be synonymous. However, the exact meaning of these two notions is not that 
clear and this can lead, as it was highlighted3, to problems for evaluating electoral systems. 
In John Rawls’ conception, the principles to be applied to the basic structure of society 
are justice and efficiency. He claimed that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as 
truth is of systems of thought”4 and it “denies that the loss of freedom for some is made 
right by a greater good shared by others”5. Hence, Rawls believed that justice as fairness is 
the guiding principle for social systems and institutions. In an attempt to identify which are 
the principles of justice as fairness in the context of a liberal society, based on his own 
version of social contract theory, Rawls concluded that the principles of justice are equal 
freedom for all (the liberty principle) and a scheme in which the economic and social 
inequalities favor the most disadvantaged members of society, under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity (the difference principle). By a social institution, he understood a 
public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, and the like. Since the voting system represents the entirety of 
legal and technical rules designed to turn the votes into seats, I believe that an electoral 
system can be considered a social institution. Following Rawls’ judgement, among other 
qualities that it may have, an electoral system must, be, first of all, fair and equitable. Thus, 
 
2 Royer –Collard, in Ihl, O., Le vote- 2e édition, Paris, Montchrestien, 2000, p. 50. 
3 Blau, A., “Fairness and Electoral Reform” , The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol. 
6, (pp. 165-181), p. 165. 
4 Rawls, J., A theory of justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971, p. 3. 
5 Idem. 
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the design of an electoral system has to be in accordance with the principles of equal 
freedom and equal opportunities. It is easy to observe that fairness and equity have almost 
the same meaning for John Rawls.   
Still, the concept of fairness is much more complex and, as Adrian Blau points out, the 
meaning of electoral fairness is not self-evident and there are several conceptions of 
fairness that are to be contemplated when discussing the matter of electoral systems6: the 
equality conception, the populist conception, the winner-takes-all conception, the majority 
conception and the plurality conception of fairness. The equality conception is a reflection 
of the principle “one man, one vote, one value” which requires that each citizen and party 
should be treated equally. The populist conception of fairness implies that voters, not party 
leaders, should choose governments. Thus, elections should be the decisive stage in 
choosing a government and not the post-elections deals between party leaders. In 
accordance with the winner-takes-all conception, the winner should take the spoils and the 
other participants shouldn’t enjoy the winnings. The majority conception states that the 
majority of voters or the majority party deserve to win and the plurality conception means 
that the largest group of voters, or the plurality party, deserves to win. Considering these 
different conceptions, one can note that “like most political concepts, fairness is matter of 
degree, not all-or-nothing”7. To avoid this conceptual confusion, I will use the concept of 
electoral equity. 
Unlike the notion of fairness, “electoral equity” has been defined in a study conducted 
by the Organization of American States in collaboration with the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, which provides that electoral equity entails “the 
existence of conditions of impartiality and freedom in the pre-electoral period, the day of 
the elections, and the post-electoral period so that all candidates can participate in a level-
playing field for political office”8. This definition, which I consider very accurate and 
comprehensive, reveals that electoral equity aims to equal opportunities of candidates and 
also to fair representation of the electorate, these two aspects being in a close connection. In 
fact, electoral equity represents a reflection of justice in the electoral field, which is a 
supreme value in any democratic state. Moreover, electoral equity is closely linked to the 
principle of equal participation of citizens in state politics, which implies that “all citizens 
are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional 
process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply”9. This principle also 
imposes an equitable representation of citizens in the legislative body and the compliance 
with the principle one man, one vote. The latter principle requires for each vote to have 
aproximately the same weight in determining the outcome of elections, which entails a 
clear and balanced distribution of seats among constituencies. For the same purpose, the 
design of the electoral constituencies should be done according to an objective procedure 
and predetermined standards and, if possible, by an independent authority. It remains to be 
seen which of the current electoral systems meets to the greatest extent these requirements. 
To make such an assessment, it is necessary to establish the criteria by which the equity of 
an electoral system can be evaluated. 
 
6 Blau, A., op.cit., p. 167. 
 7 Ibid, p. 168. 
8 Munoz-Pogossian, B., “The Responsibility to expose: Incorporating a gender perspective into OAS 
Electoral Observation Missions (OAS/EOMs)” , Electoral Studies and Projects Section Department for Electoral 
Cooperation and Observation, Organization of American States in collaboration with IDEA, December, 2011, p. 4. 
The study can be consulted at http://www.idea.int/democracydialog/upload/IDEA-Gender-and-Elections-
Betilde.pdf 
9 Rawls, J., op.cit., p. 194. 
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When voting, citizens accomplish two things at once: they contribute to forming a 
government and an opposition, and confer legitimacy to governors, who will represent their 
interests and preferences. Thus, the elections are not just a “race” that some gain at the 
expense of others, but a means by which voters participate in creating a representative 
authority. H. F. Pitkin sketched out the generic features of political representation in a 
constitutional democracy, stating that for representatives to be “democratic” (a) they must 
be authorized to act; (b) they must act in a way that promotes the interests of the 
represented and (c) people must have the means to hold their representatives accountable 
for their actions10. In order for these features of democratic representation not to remain just 
simple ideals, the electoral system should ensure, as far as possible, the reflection of 
citizens’ electoral choices in parliament, and also, compliance with the principle of equal 
suffrage.  
Because of the fact that electoral equity is a broad and rather intricate concept, the 
scholars in the electoral field were quite reluctant to establish clear criteria according to 
which one could evaluate the equity of electoral systems. In most cases, the fairness 
(equity) of an electoral system was appreciated in terms of comparison with other voting 
system and not by specific criteria.  
An interesting approach can be found in Pierre Martin’s research on electoral systems, 
who, under the premise that proportional representation is based on the idea of a fairer 
electoral system, believes that the equity of an electoral system (la justice d’une système 
électoral) should be assessed according to three criteria11: representativeness index, 
monotonicity and proportionality. In fact, Martin addresses the issue of electoral equity 
from the perspective of the translation of votes into seats and he even compares the 
electoral systems based on proportional representation between them.  
The representativeness index designates the ratio of voters effectively represented, i.e. 
those who voted for candidates or party lists that have obtained seats, and all voters. The 
data showed that, from this point of view, proportional representation systems have a much 
higher index of representativeness in relation to other electoral systems. 
Regarding the monotonicity, an electoral system is monotonic or not depending on how 
it complies with the hierarchy of votes cast, when allocating seats. It is, therefore, expected  
for a party who obtains a greater number of votes to receive more seats than a party that is 
voted by fewer electors. 
As far as the criterion of proportionality is concerned, supporters of proportional 
representation-Victor d'Hondt and Sainte-Lague had different views about the 
disproportionality index. Thus, d'Hondt proposed as disproportionality index, the maximum 
of the ratio between the percentage of seats and percentage of votes (seats/votes) obtained 
by a party. In contrast with d'Hondt, Sainte-Lagüe suggests as disproportionality index for 
all political parties participating in elections, the sum of the squares of differences between 
the percentage of seats and percentage of votes obtained by each party, that is Σ (seats-
votes)2/ votes. Both methods aim to ensure the distribution of seats in a fair manner and in 
accordance with the will of the electorate, but as M. Gallagher highlights every method of 
seat allocation generates its own measure of disproportionality, and many measures of 
 
10 Ptikin, H. F., The Concept of Representation, Berkeley, University California Press, 1967, in Nadia 
Urbinati and Mark E.Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory” , Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2008 (11:387–412), p. 393. 
11 Martin, P., Les systèmes électoraux et les modes de scrutin, Paris, Montchrestien, 1997, p. 92. 
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disproportionality implicitly endorse a method of seat allocation12. For this reason, the 
diverse PR methods should not be regarded as being more proportional or less proportional 
than each other, but as embodying different ideas as to what maximizing proportionality 
means. Thus, the d’Hondt method aims to avoid a large number of voters being represented 
by a small number of seats, while Sainte-Lagüe tends to minimize the number of 
unrepresented voters.  
Besides these two indices, there are other methods employed to measure 
disproportionality, such as the Loosemore- Hanby index, Rae index and the Least- squares 
(Gallagher) index. These three indices concentrate on the absolute difference between a  
party’s seats and votes, while d’ Hondt and Sainte- Lagüe focus on the ratio between a 
party’s seats and its votes. The Loosemore-Hanby index has been the most widely used 
measure of disproportionality and it implies calculating the overall disproportionality of an 
election by adding the absolute values of the vote-seat difference for each party and 
dividing the total by 2 . However, this index proved to be vulnerable to paradoxes, such as 
the `new state` paradox (known in the USA), in which an allocation between two states is 
disturbed by the arrival of a newcomer and this vulnerability is caused by the fact that the 
Loosemore-Hanby index is based on the largest remainders method. Unlike the Loosemore-
Hanby index, the method designed by Rae measures the total disproportionality per party 
and not by election. Thus, it consists of adding the vote- seat differences for each party 
winning more than 0.5 per cent of the votes, and then dividing the sum by the number of 
parties that fit this criterion. Despite being more sensitive to the number of parties 
participating in an election, the Rae index has its drawbacks because it can overstate the 
proportionality of multi-party systems if there are many small parties that manage to pass 
the 0.5 percentage13. The least squares index (also known as Gallagher index) entails 
squaring the vote-seat difference for each party, adding these values, dividing the sum by 2 
and taking its square root. It measures the overall disproportionality of an election and it is 
considered to be a happy medium between Loosemore-Hanby and Rae index. The index 
weights the deviations by their own value, creating a responsive index, ranging from 0 to 
100. The lower the index value, the lower the disproportionality. Unlike the Loosemore-
Hanby index, the least squares method is more sensitive to a few large discrepancies than to 
a plethora of small ones. Nevertheless, Gallagher sustains that it is superior to the ‘adjusted 
Loosemore-Hanby’ index, created by Arend Lijphart who measures the amount of 
disproportionality per party and not per election, just like Rae method. The difference 
consists in the fact that the total is divided by the `effective number of political parties` and 
not by the actual number. In spite of being superior to Rae index, as Gallagher himself 
points out, it is more complicated to calculate than the least squares index and 
overcompensates for the parties involved14. 
However, it cannot be stated that all the disproportionality encountered in an election is 
caused by the use of a certain electoral formula. There are other factors that can enhance the 
disproportionality level, such as: district magnitude, the distribution of votes between 
parties, malapportionment and also, electoral thresholds. Gallagher reaches the same 
conclusion in his study regarding the measuring of disproportionality after running an 
 
12 Gallagher, M., “Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems” , Electoral Studies, 1991, 10: 1 
(pp. 33-51), p. 38 
13 For a thorough analysis of the merits and demerits of Rae index and also of the other disproportionality 
indices, please consult Gallagher, M, op. cit, pp. 38-43. 
 
14 Idem, p. 41. 
 
Proportionality or majoritarianism? In search of electoral equity 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
                                                                                                                     II Época, Nº 8 (2013):175-190  
                                       
180
empirical test of the disproportionality indices, based on parliamentary elections from 
1979-1989 in 23 countries. Thus, he observes that the various methods of measuring 
disproportionality give different rankings of the countries involved in the analysis and that 
the d’Hondt index correlates rather weakly with the other indices and can lead to highly 
deviant rankings.  In the end, he concludes that the soundest of all measures of 
disproportionality is the Saint-Lagüe index due to its invulnerability to paradoxes and that 
besides the seat allocation formula, a very strong determinant of the proportionality level of 
an election is the district magnitude. 
Hence, even though the electoral systems based on proportional representation are 
regarded as being fairer, it is difficult to identify among them the system that presents the 
highest level of proportionality, because other factors such as district magnitude, multi-tier 
seat allocation, malaportionment and electoral thresholds may have a stronger effect on the 
level of proportionality than the electoral formula itself. 
In my opinion, the criteria devised by Pierre Martin are not sufficient in order to 
determine the equity of an electoral system. I believe that the criteria that should be 
considered when analysing the equity of an electoral system are the following: 
- the extent to which the distribution of seats reflects the rankings of the candidates 
after election; 
- the degree of representativeness of the elected authorities; 
- the compliance with the principle one man, one vote; 
- the representation of minority groups; 
- the psychological freedom of voters when casting their votes. 
I believe that other aspects envisaged by the architects of electoral systems, such as 
government stability and efficiency, by creating a majority government following the 
election, although justified, are outside the notion of electoral equity. Regarding the criteria 
I have set out, I think that special attention should be paid to the representativeness of the 
elected authorities and to the exigency of minority representation.  
“Democratic representation is fair or just representation insofar as it involves issues of 
advocacy and representativity; issues of a meaningful presence, not simply presence alone, 
in the game of discord and agreement that is democracy”15. Therefore, ensuring the 
representativeness of the elected officials lies at the heart of democracy, every citizen 
having the right to make his voice heard in the legislative forum. It was even stated that 
“representation constitutes a third, political dimension of justice, alongside the (economic) 
dimension of redistribution and the (cultural) dimension of recognition”16. Following this 
judgement, ensuring equal suffrage and fair representation of voters is only one of the 
political dimensions of justice. 
 
 
15 Urbinati, N., Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006, 
p. 42, apud. Nadia Urbinati and  Mark E.Warren, op. cit. , p. 397. 
16 Fraser, N. , “Identity, exclusion, and critique: a response to four critics” , European  Journal of Political 
Theory 6 (305–338), 2007, p. 314. 
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Minority representation constitutes an important aspect of electoral equity, being also 
imposed by the principle of pluralist democracy. It is important for the members of the 
minority groups to have their interests represented by people who share the same values 
and traditions, because “fair representation requires some relationship of trust between 
individuals and representatives, based on shared experiences, perspectives, and interests”17. 
I must note that providing political representation for persons belonging to national 
minorities implies several aspects: on the one hand, the electoral law must guarantee equal 
opportunities for candidates regarding the submission of candidacies and, on the other 
hand, the electoral system must be designed in such a way that candidates of minority 
organizations have a real and effective chance to get into Parliament. In countries where 
there are national minorities, authorities have appealed to various institutional mechanisms 
to ensure their political representation, either by adopting an electoral system based on 
proportional representation, or by reserving seats for minority organizations. For example, 
the Romanian Constitution provides in Article 62 par. (2) that "The organizations of 
citizens belonging to national minorities which fail to obtain the number of votes to be 
represented in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat, in the conditions established 
by the electoral law”. Even though the reserved seats procedure has been criticized because 
it can lead to certain inequalities, the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the 
Venice Commission provides at paragraph I.2.4. b) that “special rules guaranteeing national 
minorities reserved seats or providing for  exceptions to the normal seat allocation criteria for 
parties representing national minorities  (for instance, exemption from a quorum requirement) do 
not in principle run counter to equal suffrage”. Minority participation in political life is guaranteed 
by several international legal instruments, such as the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, whose  First Protocol enshrines at art. 3 the free expression of 
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature, and the art. 14 of the Convention provides 
that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status”. The protection of national minorities is also guaranteed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 25) and The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which provides that “The Parties 
undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of 
economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons 
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they 
shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national 
minorities” (section II, art. 4, paragraph 2). 
As one can see, the issue of minority representation has received special attention, as 
there are many legal safeguards to protect citizens belonging to national minorities. We will 
see along this approach what electoral system encourages the political representation of 
minority groups and what steps can be taken to create all the necessary conditions to ensure it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       17 Urbinati, N., Warren, M. E., “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory”,  
Annual Review of Political Science, 2008 (11:387–412), p. 394. 
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Government efficiency versus parliamentary representation 
 
If in the past electoral systems were considered among the most stable democratic 
institutions, since 1990, with the emergence of new European democracies, debates on 
electoral reforms have been high on the political agenda in most democratic states. The core 
of the debate is the dilemma of choosing either a majority voting system that favours the 
formation of a stable government, effective and accountable, or a system based on 
proportional representation, which promotes greater fairness for minority parties and 
greater diversity in the political representation of social groups.   
These two main types of electoral systems embody the two visions of democracy 
(majoritarian and proportional), as they were outlined by Bingham Powell18. A proportional 
democracy is characterized, first of all, by proportional elections to the legislature, elections 
being regarded as an instrument of influencing policymaking. Thus, in accordance with the 
proportional vision, the power is dispersed and all political parties are proportionally 
represented in parliament, which means that all groups in the society will exert an influence 
on the policymaking, at all levels. In contrast, a majoritarian democracy entails the use of a 
majoritarian voting system and the concentration of power in the hands of the incumbent 
government. Hence, the opposition is kept out from policymaking and the incumbents are 
left alone with the responsibility of governing, which facilitates accountability and 
mandate. In this context, voters control, rather than influence, the policymaking, holding 
the government accountable for its decisions. 
The choice of an electoral system is very important, given the consequences it has on 
the strategies of political parties and on the electoral behaviour. As it was stated, an 
“electoral system is closely linked to democracy, because it expresses its values, thereby 
constituting an indicator of the democratic nature of society, and it also contributes to 
strengthening democracy"19. Unfortunately, the election of a particular voting system is 
dictated more by partisan interests and political opportunism than by the principles 
governing electoral equity. This fact was also pointed out by Jean Cotteret and Claude 
Emeri who asserted that: “despite the fact that electoral laws contain many figures and 
technical expressions, they cannot be appreciated outside the political context in which they 
will be applied. They are elaborated by existing parliaments and rather than equity and 
fairness, the today elected officials are more concerned about their election, on the day of 
tomorrow”20. 
Considering these aspects, I will analyse the arguments and counter-arguments invoked 
by the supporters of majoritarian electoral systems and of those who promote proportional 
representation. 
 
Stability and Government Accountability 
 
The main argument in favour of majoritarian voting systems is that the outcome of the 
election is a stable and consistent parliamentary majority that reflects on the effectiveness 
of governance. This effect is even more pronounced if there is a two-party system, because 
the winning party's electoral success is enhanced by the majority vote, as it receives a much 
 
18 Powell, G. B. Jr., Elections as instruments of democracy- Majoritarian and Proportional Visions,  London, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000. 
19 Masclet, J. Cl., Le droit des elections politiques, Paris, P.U.F., 1992, p. 6. 
20 Cotteret, J. M.,  Emeri, C.,  Les systemes electoraux, Paris,  Presses Universitaires de France, 1988. 
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larger number of seats compared to the percentage of the votes it obtains. Thus, the stronger 
party wins an absolute majority of seats with a simple majority of votes. It is argued that a 
government which relies on a parliamentary majority is not only efficient, but also more 
responsible for the decisions it makes, given that a small change in the electoral preferences 
of citizens may result in the loss of future elections. So, whereas during its term the 
government receives all the necessary support in order to accomplish its political program, 
at the end of the mandate, if its decisions were not consistent with the interests and 
preferences of the voters, the latter can easily sanction the incumbent government. This 
advantage of the majoritarian electoral systems was placed in opposition to the effects of 
proportional representation, which generally leads to the creation of a governing coalition 
which is not characterized by the same degree of stability and durability. 
However, as shown in the electoral literature21, there are many examples that contradict 
these ideas, such as Spain and Japan who had a single party government, although they 
practiced modified versions of  proportional representation, or Germany and Denmark, 
where we find stable and lasting governing coalitions. Thus, government stability is 
determined not only by a certain electoral formula, but also by other factors equally 
important, such as the stability and discipline within each political party, the inclusion of 
minority interests by the existent parties  and also by the government, and the willingness 
of political parties (especially when they have different positions on the political spectrum) 
to  reach a compromise for the sake of a good governance. 
It is true that proportional representation does not favour the formation of a coherent 
parliamentary majority, but this does not necessarily amount to government instability. 
Furthermore, a coalition government is not necessarily inferior to a single party government 
and doesn’t lead to conflictive and blocked governance, in all circumstances. As Sartori 
alleges, the ability of a coalition government to effectively govern depends a great deal on 
the overall polarization of the political system22. Thus, in a strongly polarized society, the 
coalitions will be heterogeneous and the governing parties will find it difficult to cooperate 
with each other. On the contrary, in a relatively non polarized society, the coalitions will be 
homogeneous and due to their loosely defined ideologies, the political parties will easily 
reach an agreement. Still, in order to avoid excessive political fragmentation of the 
parliament and therefore instability, the states that practice an electoral system based on 
proportional representation have established electoral thresholds. Even though electoral 
thresholds diminish the proportionality of an electoral system, they represent, as long as 
they are not too high, an efficient mechanism to prevent an excessive fragmentation of the 
party system. 
 An important plus for proportional representation is the fact that it reduces the number 
of wasted votes, as all votes are taken into consideration and also leads to a fairer ratio 
between the percentage of votes obtained by the candidates and the percentage of assigned 
seats. Therefore, even though sometimes generates a mosaic of parliamentary parties, 
proportional representation has a series of advantages that largely compensate for its 
deficiencies and which bring it closer to the ideal of electoral equity. 
It is incontestable that majoritarian systems are simpler and more easily understood by 
voters than the various types of proportional representation, but, in my opinion, these 
qualities do not represent sufficient arguments to justify opting for such a system. In the 
 
        21 Hix, S., Johnston, R. and McLean, I., “Chosing an electoral system. A research report prepared  for 
the British Academy” ,  British Academy Policy Centre, March- 2010, p. 17. 
22 Sartori, G., Ingegneria constiutzionale comparata, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004, p.74. 
 
Proportionality or majoritarianism? In search of electoral equity 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
                                                                                                                     II Época, Nº 8 (2013):175-190  
                                       
184
following section, I will address the virtues of proportional representation and, in the same 
time, the reasons why it is regarded as being more equitable than majority voting systems. 
 
Representativeness and legitimacy 
 
The main quality invoked by the supporters of proportional representation is that it 
tends towards electoral justice as it allows representation of all currents of opinion and 
ensures the minority representation in parliament. Thus, proportional representation realizes 
a “radiography” of the political physiognomy of a state, reflecting the various trends and 
opinions existing in society, which represents one of the functions of elections. Showing his 
support for proportional representation, Joseph Barthélémy claimed that “the principle of 
proportionality responds, consequently, to an elementary sense of justice, to a fundamental 
need for loyalty and truth. There will come a day when we consider the proportionality 
principle as important as the principle of universal suffrage”23. By ensuring the 
representation of most citizens’ preferences, the electoral systems based on proportional 
representation lead to the formation of a parliament with a higher degree of 
representativeness than in the case of majoritarian voting systems. Increasing the 
representativeness of parliament implicitly results in enhancing its legitimacy. 
As I argued in the previous section, the representation of national minorities is of 
particular importance because it also influences the legitimacy of parliament. Unlike the 
majoritarian voting systems, especially plurality voting (the winner-takes-all), proportional 
representation favours minority representation and also the representation of minor parties. 
In the single-member district majority systems, the geographic concentration of the voters 
belonging to national minorities is crucial for the outcome of the election. In contrast, in the 
case of proportional representation, when the district magnitude is high, the results of the 
election will be more proportional and more equitable. As J. S. Mill argued, 
nonproportional counting as occurs in majoritarian systems is a violation of quantitative 
equity, whereas proportional representation “secures a representation, in proportion to 
numbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone”24. 
Consequently, proportional representation, with all its variants is more favorable to the 
representation of minority voices. However, even within the different forms of proportional 
representation, there are large discrepancies regarding the degree to which the 
representation of small parties is encouraged. The most equitable of all proportional 
systems is considered by some scholars to be Sainte-Lagüe because is the most appropriate 
method for the allocation of seats within the geographical units, as it does not disadvantage 
small administrative units25. Others, like Arend Lijphart26, believe that the electoral formula 
which renders the most proportional results is the largest remainders method using the Hare 
quota. In Lijphart’s conception, the modified Sainte-Lagüe represents an intermediate 
category and d’ Hondt is the least proportional system, because it favours larger parties. As 
 
23 Barthélémy, J., L’organisation du suffrage et l’expérience belge, Giard et Brière, 1922, p. 530, apud. Gilia, 
C., “Reformarea sistemului electoral românesc. Consideratii privind noile reglementări în materie electorală” , 
Bucharest, Studii de Drept Românesc, an 20 (53), nr. 3–4, p. 291–308, iulie–decembrie 2008,p. 304. 
24 Mill, J. S.,  Considerations on representative government, in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. J. Gray, pp. 
205–470. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991, p. 310, apud. Nadia Urbinati and Mark E.Warren, op. cit., p. 
395. 
25 Gilia, C., Sisteme si proceduri electorale, Bucharest, Editura C. H. Beck, 2007, p. 88. 
26 See Farrell, D. M., Electoral Systems. A comparative introduction-2nd Edition, London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, p.73. 
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for me, I subscribe to the first opinion because despite the fact that the largest remainders 
with the Hare quota tends to be slightly more generous to less popular parties, it can also 
lead to paradoxes (like the Alabama paradox), violating one of the fundamental qualities of 
fair electoral system, namely monotonicity.  
Another issue that was pointed out in the electoral theory is that proportional 
representation tends to strengthen national unity (or rather national uniformity), while 
majoritarian systems exacerbate local differences27. The consequences of this phenomenon 
are fortunate or unfortunate depending on the particularities of each country. So, whereas in 
France, proportional representation deepened the tendency towards centralization and 
uniformity, which was unfortunate, in Belgium it mitigated the rivalry between Flemings 
and Walloons28, avoiding the appearance of two parties with an autonomist nature. In the 
USA, majority voting unfortunately strengthened the opposition between North and South. 
Besides the fact that it ensures the representation of the full range of citizens’ political 
preferences, proportional representation leads to a fairer ratio between the percentage of 
votes obtained by the parties and the percentage of seats they win, which constitutes, as I 
have asserted in the previous section, one of the criteria for assessing the equity of an 
electoral system. Furthermore, unlike the two-round runoff voting, it avoids the “electoral 
kitchen” and the false alliances between the two rounds. It is true that the fairness of 
proportional representation is diminished by setting electoral thresholds, but as I stated 
before, thresholds are necessary in order to avoid an excessive fragmentation of the 
political scene. In their absence, the consequences could be disastrous, the Weimar 
Republic being a clear example in this respect. However, in a judgment delivered on 9 
November 2011 (BVC 4/10, 2 REB 6/10, 2 REB 8/10), the German Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled that the legal provision setting a threshold of 5% to obtain mandates, which was 
applied for the 2009 European Parliament elections, violates the principle of equal suffrage 
and the principle of equal opportunities for all political parties29. The same legal provision 
was subject to constitutional review in 1979, when the Court held that the imposition of 5% 
threshold is consistent with the fundamental law as it is necessary and appropriate to avoid 
fragmentation of the European Parliament in a large number of parties.  
In the 2011 decision, the Court emphasized the importance and the increased 
prerogatives of Parliament in the European institutional framework and also the imperative 
that every vote has the same weight on the outcome of elections. For these reasons, the 
Court considered that the 5% threshold entails the waste of votes cast for parties that have 
not obtained the minimum percentage of votes, those voters having no influence on the 
electoral process, and it also implies a violation of the principle of equal opportunities for 
political parties. Moreover, the Court held that the violation of these principles cannot be 
justified by the general and abstract argument that the large number of political parties 
would prevent the shaping of a political will of the European Parliament. In the Court's 
view, the large number of existing parties (at the time, over 160) in the European 
Parliament doesn’t affect the proper functioning of the institution, but is consistent with its 
specific character, especially considering the important role of political groups. In addition, 
the Court stated that the high number of political parties has not generated the inability of 
 
27 Duverger, Maurice, Les partis politiques, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1976, p. 503. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Reflets no. 2/2011, Brief information on legal developments of Community interest, Library, 
Documentation and Research Directorate;  
http://www.juradmin.eu/en/reflets/pdf/Reflets%202011%20No%202.pdf.  For the content of the decision, consult 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/cs20111109_2bvc000410.html 
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political groups to reach an agreement and that, anyway, the difficulty of creating a majority 
is not a strong enough reason to violate the principles of equal suffrage and equal 
opportunities. What is interesting in the Court’s rationale is that, when comparing the 
threshold set for the European elections with the electoral threshold provided for the 
national elections (5%), it assesses that there is a significant difference between the two 
types of elections, whereas the European Parliament doesn’t have to designate a 
government that needs the support of a stable majority. The Court’s argumentation seems 
somewhat contradictory since it claims that for national elections the diminishing of 
electoral equity is justified in order to ensure a certain degree of stability and efficiency, 
while for European elections the need to create a majority doesn’t have the same 
importance. In the invoked decision, there were two separate opinions of judges Di Fabio 
and Mellinghoff, who appreciated that the 5% threshold is complementary to the electoral 
system based on proportional representation, any violation of the principle of equal suffrage 
being justified. Moreover, they argued that the fundamental law doesn’t impose any type of 
electoral system, which means that even a majoritarian system could be adopted, despite the 
fact that it would affect to a larger extent the principle of equal suffrage. 
In my opinion, even though electoral equity should guide the designing of an electoral 
system, the setting of a threshold it is necessary to guarantee a certain level of coherence in 
the legislative assembly. Usually, the electoral thresholds vary from 1% to 8%, being 3 % 
(Spain), 5 % (Germany and Romania) or 8 % (Liechtenstein). The thresholds should be at a 
reasonable level so that they don’t reduce drastically the proportionality of the system. In 
practice, it was proved that electoral thresholds can generate a level of disproportionality as 
high as the majoritarian systems, as happened in Romania's parliamentary elections, in 
2000, when the disproportionality index was over 20 %,  or in Bulgaria, where a 4 % 
threshold caused the loss of almost a quarter of the votes cast (24, 9 %).30 Furthermore, the 
electoral thresholds may impede the minority representation, which is why some states have 
adopted various mechanisms to combat this phenomenon, either by establishing a fixed 
quota (the case of the Flemish minority in the regional parliament, in Bruxelles) or by the 
procedure of reserved seats if the electoral threshold is not reached, as in Romania. 
Considering all these aspects, it can be assessed that even though proportional 
representation is closer to the ideal of electoral equity, has its own deficiencies. Dividing 
too much the representative assembly, it diminishes its efficiency, leaving the government 
without a strong support and unable to act promptly. 31Plus, it doesn’t determine the 
emergence of a true general will and it confers far too much power to political parties, who 
establish the order of the candidates in the case of list voting systems. 
Choosing between a majoritarian system and a form of proportional representation 
ultimately equals opting for government stability and efficiency or for a more 
representative parliament and a fairer seat allocation. Although, I don’t deny the importance 
of an effective and strong government for the good functioning of society, I strongly believe 
that electoral equity shouldn’t be sacrificed in the name of good governance. 
 
 
 
 
30 Centru de resurse pentru Democratie al Asociatiei Pro Democratia, 25+2 modele electorale, Bucharest, 
2006, p. 7. 
31 Dănior, D. C. ,  Drept Constitutional si Institutii politice, Craiova, Editura Sitech, 2006, p. 388. 
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The impact of electoral systems on the psychological freedom of voters 
 
As stated above, the psychological freedom of voters when casting their ballots is one of 
the aspects that should be taken into account when analysing the equity of an electoral 
system. The influence of electoral systems on voting behaviour has been the subject of 
many studies, which resulted in the enunciation of two main ideas, namely that majoritarian 
systems encourage strategic voting and proportional representation gives voters greater 
psychological freedom. Thus, the single round majority system determine voters of small 
parties to vote strategically by choosing between two mutually exclusive political trends, 
because they are aware of the fact that the parties they prefer have little chance to win the 
electoral competition. Therefore, in order not to waste their votes, the electors prefer to vote 
for one of the strongest parties, the vote being given mostly by virtue aversion towards the 
political opponents of the party they support. So, in these circumstances, the vote acquires 
negative valences. Because strategic voting doesn’t reflect a political belief, there is a 
transfer of the manifestation of political nuances to the other associative structures of civil 
society, outside political parties, namely pressure groups32. The psychological impact of 
electoral system also reflects upon the level of polarization of the society, being proved that 
majoritarian systems favour the polarization of the electorate and causes the diminishing of 
the number of parties participating in elections33. 
In the context of two-round runoff voting, voter psychology is slightly different, as their 
freedom of choice is higher. In the first round, electors vote for their favourite candidate, 
even if they know he has no real chance to win, their vote being positive, communicative. 
The first round can be, therefore, a good predictor of a country's political physiognomy. 
Between the two rounds, various agreements may occur between political parties with 
similar doctrines, which will decisively influence voting behaviour. Consequently, if in the 
first round the voters enjoy a large freedom of choice, in the second round their 
psychological freedom is significantly reduced, as they may find themselves forced to vote 
strategically. Thus, if the candidates they prefer don’t manage to get into the second round, 
the voters will have to vote either for the candidate who is closer to their political views, or 
for the candidate who stands more chances to prevent a candidate they resent to win the 
election. One of the supporters of the two-round system is Giovanni Sartori, who 
considers34 that this system confers the voters not only a second chance to make a choice, 
but also the opportunity to make a rational choice. In addition, Sartori argues that the two 
round voting system tempers the political scene by determining the political parties to reach 
rational compromises after the first round of voting. However, as the same author states35, 
the two round system punishes the ideological politics and rewards the pragmatic politics. 
The greatest drawback of this majoritarian system is that it can cause a distortion of the 
popular vote36, because the transactions and the negotiations sometimes take place far away 
from the voters’ eyes, the latter voting unwittingly. 
 
 
32 Nica, E. M., Drept electoral, Craiova, Editura Sitech, 2010, p. 220. 
33 See the analysis of Andre Blais and R. K. Carty regarding the mechanical and psychological factors of 
electoral systems as they were defined by Maurice Duverger, in The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: 
Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor,  British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 79-93. 
34 Sartori, G., op.cit., p.79. 
35 Ibidem. 
36 Southwell, P. L., “Fairness, governability, and legitimacy: The debate over electoral systems in France, 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology”, 1997; 25, 2 (pp. 163-185); ProQuest Central, p. 164 
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Unlike the majoritarian systems, proportional representation provides voters with a 
greater psychological freedom, because the voters are aware of the fact that is more likely 
to be represented in parliament by the party they prefer. It is true that also in the context of 
proportional representation, if a certain electoral threshold is required, the vote may have a 
strategic character for the supporters of the parties who fail to pass the threshold. Moreover, 
opponents of proportional representation argue that in the case of list voting system, the 
freedom of choice is rather limited, depending on the list drawn up by the party leaders. I 
don’t contest the drastic limitation of voters’ psychological freedom when the lists are 
blocked, but there are several variants of proportional representation that don’t have this 
effect, but rather extend citizens’ freedom of choice. Of all the forms of proportional 
representation, the most equitable in terms of psychological freedom of the electorate is, in 
my opinion, the single transferable vote, which respects the individual candidacies and 
encourages parties to reveal any alliances or arrangements between them. The advantage of 
this type of voting consists primarily in that it allows the voter to choose his representative 
and, simultaneously, assures him that his vote for a certain candidate will not benefit 
another candidate of the same party, whom he doesn’t want. Besides, the single transferable 
vote gives voters the opportunity to express a “cross vote”, by selecting candidates who 
belong to different political parties, but have common views on certain issues. Proportional 
representation is promoted by Arend Lijphart37 too, who asserts that it stimulates turnout 
precisely because it offers more options from which to choose and largely eliminates the 
problem of wasted votes. 
All in all, it appears that proportional representation gives voters greater freedom than 
majoritarian systems, providing them with an opportunity to express their right to vote 
based on their real political preferences and not depending on the party’s chances to win the 
electoral battle. One must, nevertheless, consider that besides the electoral system, there are 
other factors that influence voting behaviour, such as the education level, the economic 
situation, the perception of voters about the incumbent government, the attitude and level of 
interest in politics, the level of media freedom. Therefore, the impact of electoral systems 
on voting behaviour should not be overestimated, but should be analysed according to the 
particularities of the political system of each country. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The design of the electoral system is essential for the formation and development of 
modern democracies. Both proportional representation and majoritarian systems have their 
merits, but also deficiencies that draw them away from electoral equity.  In an attempt to 
reconcile these two different visions about elections, G. B. Powell suggests that “given the 
benefits that each model confers, it would be desirable to succeed with both, rather than 
trading one off against the other”38. This desire to combine the qualities of proportional 
representation and majority voting and eliminate their weaknesses led to the emergence of 
mixed electoral systems. Thus, there are various types of mixed systems which combine 
majoritarian elements with proportional ones, aiming to build a fair and operative electoral 
system. The intention was noble, but the result wasn’t always the intended one. J. Cotteret 
 
37 Lijphart, A., “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma” , American Political Science 
Review 91(1), 1997, p. 7. 
38 Powell, G. B., op. cit., p. 235. 
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and C. Emeri described the mixed systems in a very suggestive manner, stating that39 “the 
legislator acts like a bartender when preparing a cocktail: a finger of proportional 
representation and two of majority voting or vice versa. In both cases, the inventor is often 
more than satisfied with its mix than the consumer-voter”. Unfortunately, despite the well-
intentioned objectives that were behind the design of mixed systems, they have been 
criticized for their complexity and difficulty, especially because they are more difficult to 
understand by voters. 
One of the most praised mixed electoral systems is the German electoral system, which 
represents an attempt to combine "the best of both worlds": a true mirror of the opinion of 
the people is "adopted" from the system of proportional representation and single-member 
districts are "borrowed" from the majority system40. The German electoral system is a 
mixed-member proportional one, which combines proportional representation with the 
majority system in order to compensate for any disproportionality in representation 
resulting from the single-member district portion of the election. For this reason, this 
system was also called "balanced mixed system" or "personalized proportional 
representation”. Despite its merits, the German electoral system has been criticized, 
because it is considered that due to the fact that electors have two votes, nothing prevents 
political parties not to officially present candidates in the single member constituencies, 
allowing the latter to candidate as independents or supported by an artificial party, which 
would give them priority in obtaining direct mandates and also, would enable them to 
benefit from the maximum compensation41. I agree that such a practice might occur, but 
weighing the pros and cons of German electoral system, I think it illustrates a harmonious 
combination of the two largest systems, being the closest version to the ideal of electoral 
equity. Besides, even the author that highlights the potential harmful effects of the German 
system, admits that such a political manoeuvring has never been used in Germany and 
recognizes the seductive character of the German electoral system for those who want to 
combine elements of proportional representation with majoritarian elements.  
In conclusion, the answer to the question which is the most equitable electoral system 
can be neither simple nor categorical, because it depends on a number of factors, such as 
the socio-political context, the degree of democratization, the stability of political parties  
and the existence of national minorities. Thus, in countries which are divided by the 
existence of deeply rooted ethnic or religious cleavages, even though proportional 
representation seems to be more appropriate due to its inclusive nature, it could have the 
opposite effect, reinforcing these cleavages, instead of attenuating them. In strongly 
centralized states, a majoritarian voting system may have an undesirable effect too, as it 
may generate governments’ alienation from the electorate, because knowing that it has the 
support of a stable parliamentary majority, the government won’t need to appeal to public 
consultations or debates in order to implement its political programs. 
Although each state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in choosing its electoral 
system, as it was enshrined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), depending on 
their political, historical, socioeconomic particularities, all democratic constitutions contain 
either expressis verbis, or implicitly a set of binding principles which are relevant to 
political representation and should serve as guidelines for designing the electoral system.  
Even the ECHR stated that states must harmonize the objectives of electoral systems, which 
 
39 Cotteret, J-M.,  Emeri, , Cl. , op.cit. , p. 73-74. 
40 Shugart, M.S., Wattenberg, M.P., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems, The Best of Both Worlds?, Oxford 
University Press 2003, p. 270  and the following. 
41 Martin, P., op. cit., p. 87. 
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are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand, to reflect fairly 
faithfully the opinions of the people, and on the other, to channel currents of thought so as 
to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. In these 
circumstances, the phrase "conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature" implies essentially - apart from freedom of 
expression (already protected under Article 10 of the Convention) (art. 10) – the principle 
of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to 
stand for election”42. 
 Consequently, the legislator must seriously analyse the political and constitutional 
system as a whole and consider all the principles essential for any authentic democracy, 
when designing the electoral system. These principles are the principle of equal suffrage, 
principle of equal opportunities of political parties, political pluralism and free expression 
of the popular will. Only an electoral system that respects these constitutional principles 
and also takes into account the historical, political, economic and social realities within the 
state, can be considered to tend towards electoral equity. 
 
 
42 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt versus Belgium (March, 2nd, 1987) 10 EHRR 1, par. 54. 
 
